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Corporate Governance and Bank Risk-taking 
 
Abhishek Srivastav* and Jens Hagendorff 
ABSTRACT 
Manuscript Type: Review 
Research Question/Issue: Bank governance has become the focus of a flurry of recent 
research and heated policy debates. However, the literature presents seemingly conflicting 
evidence on the implications of governance for bank risk-taking. The purpose of this paper is 
to review prior work and propose directions for future research on the role of governance on 
bank stability.  
Research Findings/Insights: We highlight a number of key governance devices and how 
these shape bank risk-taking: the effectiveness of bank boards, the structure of CEO 
compensation, and the risk management systems and practices employed by banks. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: Prior work primarily views bank governance as a 
mechanism to protect the interests of bank shareholders only. However, given that taxpayer-
funded guarantees protect a substantial share of EDQNV¶ liabilities and that banks are highly-
leveraged, shareholder-focused governance may well subordinate the interests of other 
stakeholders and exacerbate risk-taking concerns in the banking industry. Our review 
highlights the need for internal governance mechanisms to mitigate such behavior by 
reflecting the needs of shareholders, creditors and the taxpayer.  
Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our review argues that the relationship between 
governance and risk is central from a financial stability perspective. Future research on issues 
highlighted in the review offer a footing for reforming bank governance to constrain 
potentially undesirable risk-taking by banks. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Banks, Board of Directors, CEO pay, Risk 
Management 
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 INTRODUCTION 
There has been considerable academic and regulatory interest in how to mitigate bank risk-
taking behavior in recent years. Undue risk-taking by banks jeopardizes the safety and 
soundness of individual institutions as well as the stability of the entire financial sector when 
contagion causes risks to spill over to other financial institutions.  
A case in point is the financial crisis that started in 2008. It is by now a widely-held 
view that the vulnerability of the banking sector during the crisis was at least in part caused 
by a build-up of excessive risk by some banks before the crisis (Brunnermeier, 2009; 
DeYoung, Peng, & Yan, 2013). Further, there is significant discussion over the extent to 
which governance failures have contributed to the risk exposures of banks. In particular, there 
are questions over whether bank boards were unable to effectively monitor and control bank 
risk, whether executive pay was excessively structured to promote risk-taking, and whether 
EDQNV¶ risk management systems were adequate (Bebchuk & Spamann, 2009; Kashyap, 
Rajan, & Stein, 2008; Kirkpatrick, 2009)1. The purpose of this paper is to focus on these 
issues by reviewing existing research on bank governance and risk with a view to formulate 
empirical questions for future research.  
Our review is set against the background of recent regulatory reforms that have placed 
great emphasis on reforming governance in order to control bank risk-taking (Basel 
Committee, 2014; Federal Reserve, 2010; Liikanen Report, 2012). To date, policymakers and 
regulators have focused on specific governance shortcomings. In the UK, the Walker review 
(2009) focused on making recommendations on board arrangements and the qualifications of 
board members as well as on the compensation arrangements of UK banks and financial 
firms. Similarly, the Netherlands has had a Banking Code in place since 2010 that contains 
guidelines on the make-up of bank boards, including the qualification and training of board 
members and their remuneration. Additionally, compensation guidelines for CEOs and other 
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 senior executives at large banks have raised the need for pay instruments to align managerial 
interests with ensuring bank stability (Federal Reserve, 2010).  
However, Kashyap et al. (2008) argue that existing reforms tend to address only 
specific governance shortcomings, such as those related to pay or board composition, but do 
not address more fundamental governance flaws. Equally, Becht, Bolton, & Roell (2011) note 
that ongoing reforms tend to follow pre-crisis traditions whereby governance mechanisms put 
shareholders firmly in control. This has resulted in considerable academic interest in 
identifying alternative approaches to reforming bank governance. For instance, the IMF 
(2014) conducted a review of the extant literature on bank governance and assessed the 
impact of various governance measures on bank risk and performance. Specifically, the 
report argues that extant research has largely looked at the impact of governance on bank risk 
by looking at a select few governance mechanisms in isolation.  
Further, Stulz (2015) argues that governance plays an important role in helping banks 
pursue an µRSWLPDO¶ level of risk that allows managers to maximize shareholder value while 
also taking into account the social costs of bank failures. To achieve this objective, Stulz 
discusses the role of an effective risk management framework in identifying, measuring, and 
controlling bank risk exposures. Similarly, de Haan and Vlahu (2015) also review the 
corporate governance literature in banks, but their focus is primarily on the link between 
governance and bank performance (rather than governance and risk).  
Our study builds upon the IMF (2014) study and other existing work by taking a 
slightly different approach. We focus on reviewing the extant literature to identify µEOLQG 
VSRWV¶ or policy-relevant research topics that have received limited research attention to date. 
In particular, this review differs from prior work in that we argue that bank governance 
should not be limited to appeasing shareholder interests, but also account for the interests of 
creditors and taxpayers²two stakeholder groups that play an important role in the banking 
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 industry. To this end, we examine the current state of research on internal bank governance 
by focusing on three broad themes and their impact on bank risk: the effectiveness of bank 
boards, the risk management systems and practices employed by banks, and the structure of 
CEO compensation (see Table 1 for a brief summary of prior research on different elements 
of bank governance and risk-taking). Ultimately, the purpose of this paper is to formulate 
questions for future empirical research. 
Bank boards are the apex of the internal governance system. Boards hold overall 
responsibility for providing oversight into the monitoring of bank management, setting 
executive compensation contracts, and implementing an effective system of risk governance. 
To this end, our review first looks into the role of the board in terms of monitoring and 
advising senior bank executives. Next, our review looks into the role of executive 
compensation. Prior empirical literature has argued that bank boards structured executive pay 
to reward executives for excessive risk-taking through the use of stock options and short-term 
pay (DeYoung et al., 2010; Federal Reserve, 2010). Our review presents valuable insights on 
alternate pay mechanisms that can motivate bank managers to take into account the interests 
of other stakeholders. Finally, a ERDUG¶V ability to offer effective risk oversight is also 
conditional on accurate risk assessment and timely communication by the risk committee. To 
this end, our review highlights various research avenues that can further our understanding on 
the impact of risk management practices (e.g. presence of risk committee and Chief Risk 
Officer, and risk culture) on risk-taking.  
Research on topical issues highlighted in this review may help inform policy research 
in developing sound and balanced governance structures. This can help in developing a more 
textured understanding of how each governance dimension operates. For instance, the review 
highlights how director skills and expertise affect risk monitoring and how the use of debt-
based pay instruments for senior executives results in less risky bank policies. 
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 This review article is organized as follows. The next section presents the theoretical 
foundations of governance and risk for banks. We then review past and ongoing research on 
the role of the monitoring role of board of directors, the impact of CEO compensation 
instruments on risk-taking and the role of risk governance in banks. The final section 
concludes. 
BACKGROUND 
We start this section by surveying existing measures of bank risk-taking that have been 
adopted by prior research. We then outline the theoretical foundations for why the risk-taking 
behavior by banks is of particular significance and how banks differ from non-banking 
institutions in important ways. In particular, we argue that EDQNV¶ core activities are 
information-based and highly opaque, their capital structure is geared toward debt much more 
than any other major industry, and that the government is an important stakeholder in banks 
as an underwriter of guarantees. Finally, we highlight how µWUDGLWLRQDO¶ governance 
frameworks (i.e. those that align manager and shareholder interests) may result heightened 
risk-taking concerns in the banking industry. 
Bank Risk-taking 
For the purposes of this review, we define bank risk-taking as policies that increase risk 
through any of various channels. We discuss some of the commonly used proxies for bank 
risk below. 
Market risk captures losses incurred due to the impact of adverse market movements 
on the value of EDQNV¶ on- and off-balance sheet positions. Recent regulatory reforms have 
focused on the framework used by banks to assess market risk since losses incurred on EDQNV¶ 
trading books during the recent crisis had depleted bank capital and heightened financial 
stability concerns (Basel Committee, 2012). Prior work has measured market risk through tail 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved..
 risk measures, such as Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall to estimate expected 
losses in the case of tail events (Bekkum, 2015; Ellul & Yeramilli, 2013). Another common 
measure is stock volatility (Anderson & Fraser, 2000; Chen, Steiner, & Whyte, 2006; Konishi 
& Yasuda, 2004). 
Further, default risk is a composite measure of bank risk that combines risks arising 
from investment and financing activities. Prior work has focused on measuring default risk 
through either an accounting-based measure Z-score (Houston, Lin, Lin, & Ma, 2010; Laeven 
& Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009) or a market-based measure based on 0HUWRQ¶V structural 
distance-to-default model (Gropp, Vesala & Vulpes, 2006; Hagendorff & Vallascas, 2011).  
Relatedly, banks can also pursue policies that result in shifting the costs of default to 
the taxpayer. To measure risk shifting, studies have sought to estimate the value of the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V financial safety net to shareholders as the value of a put option underwritten by 
taxpayers (Hovakimian & Kane, 2000; Merton, 1977; Ronn & Verma, 1986).  
Leverage risk is defined as the risk arising from banks holding low amounts of capital 
to support their operations. Leverage risk is commonly measured using book capital ratios, 
such as high-quality (Tier-1) capital or risk-adjusted capital ratios (Flannery & Rangan, 2008; 
Gropp & Heider, 2010; Nier & Baumann, 2006). Finally, portfolio risk is defined as the 
volatility of asset returns arising from a EDQN¶V investment activities. Prior work has 
measured the portfolio risk of banks using the ratio of risk-weighted assets to assets or either 
book-based or market-based measures of asset volatility (Flannery & Rangan, 2008; Shrieves 
& Dahl, 1992; Vallascas & Hagendorff, 2013).  
Theory: Are Banks Different? 
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 Banking theory outlines various characteristics that differentiate banks from non-financial 
firms (Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993; Diamond & Dybvig, 1983; Merton, 1977). This section 
focuses on the implications of these characteristics on bank risk-taking.  
At its core, banking involves institutions accepting short-term liquid deposits and 
transforming them into long-term illiquid loans. During this intermediation process, banks 
privately monitor and collect information about the quality of their loan portfolio. Since bank 
loans are informationally opaque, external stakeholders cannot possess all relevant 
information to assess the true value of bank assets (Diamond, 1989, 1991; Morgan, 2002). As 
a result, managers may pursue policies that increase bank risk, without reflecting this being 
reflected on backward looking balance sheets (Becht et al., 2011; Mehran, Morrison, & 
Shapiro, 2011). 
Further, banks are unique because they benefit from explicit deposit insurance 
guarantees and more implicit guarantees in the form of emergency liquidity and the 
possibility of capital assistance (i.e. bailouts) in times of distress (Bhattacharya & Thakor, 
1993). Government guarantees act as a put option on a EDQN¶V assets and the value of this put 
is increasing in bank risk (Kareken & Wallace, 1978; Merton, 1977). Banks seek to maximize 
the value of the put by pursuing policies that increase overall risk. Consistent with this view, 
the extant literature has provided evidence of increased risk-taking in the presence of 
government guarantees (Dam & Koetter, 2012; Hovakimian & Kane, 2000).  
Finally, banks are highly levered financial institutions where leverage exists as a 
factor of production2. Leverage results in exacerbating risk-taking concerns because the 
option value of government guarantees to shareholders is increasing with firm leverage, 
which leads to magnified benefits of increasing bank risk for highly levered banks (Bebchuk 
& Spamann, 2009; John, Mehran, & Qian, 2010; Keeley & Furlong, 1990). 
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 Shareholder-oriented v Stakeholder-oriented Bank Governance 
Governance mechanisms deal with the ways in which outside investors and other 
stakeholders, such as government and employees, exercise control over senior management 
and other corporate insiders in order to protect their interests. Prior work has interpreted this 
from an agency-theoretic framework where utility-maximizing managers are risk-averse and 
lack the incentives to pursue risky but positive NPV projects (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To 
mitigate the agency costs of equity, key governance structures focus on protecting and 
promoting shareholder interests. Examples of this are the presence of independent directors 
on bank boards, the widespread use of equity instruments in executive remuneration, and a 
general assessment of executive performance on the basis of meeting shareholder interests 
(Holmstron, 1982; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Smith & Stulz, 1985; Weisbach, 1988). 
However, there are conflicts between the risk preferences of shareholders and bank 
creditors. Shareholders hold convex claims over firm assets which cause their expected 
payoffs to rise exponentially with bank risk (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). By contrast, creditor 
payoffs are concave due to limited upside potential on the value of their claims. For creditors, 
excessive risk-taking, therefore, implies a higher probability of losses without the same 
potential for gains that shareholders benefit from. Such conflicts between bank shareholders 
and creditors are further exacerbated by bank bailout guarantees. There is a real prospect that 
highly leveraged banks take on undue risks in ways that benefits bank shareholders at the 
expense of creditors and the taxpayer (Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993; John, Saunders, & 
Senbet, 1991).  
 This risk-shifting problem in banking (when banks force taxpayers to finance their 
risk exposures) is widely recognized. For instance, John, Saunders & Senbet (2000) show that 
aligning the interests between managers and shareholders results in banks taking risks that 
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 benefit bank shareholders at the expense of creditors and the taxpayer. Bolton, Mehran, & 
Shapiro (2015) also develop a theoretical model to show that shareholders lack appropriate 
incentives to control risk-taking by banks in order to take advantage of government 
guarantees and inability of external stakeholders to accurately measure bank risk.  
 In response to this issue, various scholars have proposed the need for bank 
governance to represent the interests of shareholders, creditors and taxpayers (Adams & 
Mehran, 2003; Berger, Kick, & Schaeck, 2014; Bolton et al., 2015; Macey and 2¶+DUD 
2003). Prior research provides some supporting evidence on the role of creditors and 
depositors in disciplining bank risk-taking. This stream shows that risky banks are charged 
higher interest rates in the interbank borrowing market (Furfine, 2001; King, 2008) and the 
subordinated debt market (Flannery & Sorescu, 1996). Depositors can also discipline risk-
taking by demanding higher interest rates (Berger & Turk-Ariss, 2014; Martinez Peria & 
Schmukler, 2001). However, this research has focused on the role of creditors in externally 
monitoring bank risk-taking. Aligning manager and creditor interests through internal 
governance mechanisms (e.g. through executive pay that reflects creditor wealth) is likely to 
be a more effective and the foundation of a governance mechanism that balances the interests 
of shareholders and creditors. 
The next section focuses on the role of bank boards in controlling bank risk-taking 
and meeting creditor interests. We highlight a range of board characteristics that moderate a 
ERDUG¶V ability to monitor executives and can, therefore, help to protect creditor interests and 
maintain bank stability more generally.  
THE ROLE OF THE BOARD IN MONITORING AND CONTROLLING RISK 
The board of directors is widely regarded as the cornerstone of an effective internal 
governance framework (Fama & Jensen, 1983). It has ultimate responsibility for risk 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved..
 management and setting the tone for a EDQN¶V risk-taking culture at the top. The board ensures 
bank stability by monitoring executives over the impact of firm policies on bank risk, 
evaluating if current and future risk-exposure is consistent with risk appetite, and designing 
executive incentives to promote prudent risk-taking.  
Despite the key role that boards play in ensuring an effective system of governance, 
academic research on the impact of board characteristics on bank risk-taking is strikingly 
sparse. Most of the research in this area has been derived from non-financial firms (e.g. 
Adams & Ferreira (2008); Almazan & Suarez (2003); Harris & Raviv (2008); Hermalin & 
Weisbach (1998); Raheja (2005)).  
Overall, the extant empirical research on the impact of boards on bank risk-taking 
presents ambiguous evidence. Akhigbe & Martin (2008) study the impact of the Sarbanes-
Oxley (SOX) Act on financial institutions. The authors show that firms with independent 
boards see a decline in their stock volatility over the long-term. Erkens, Hung, & Matos 
(2012) do not find any impact of board independence on bank risk during the financial crisis 
for a sample of large international banks. By contrast, Pathan (2009) reports that stronger 
boards, that is, boards which are smaller and exhibit stronger shareholder rights, are 
positively related to bank risk-taking. However, the author reports that boards characterized 
by a higher fraction of independent directors pursue less risky policies. Beltratti & Stulz 
(2012) also present evidence to show that banks with a shareholder-friendly board were more 
risky, although the results do not hold when the authors use different measures of risk. 
Previous research suffers from the issue that the advisory and monitoring roles of the 
board are not directly observable. This has caused researchers to look at the impact of boards 
on observable outcomes such as bank policies or performance instead (Adams, Hermalin, & 
Weisbach, 2010). Moreover, board independence is a broad measure that fails to account for 
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 more nuanced board dynamics. The following two sub-sections examine more fine-grained 
aspects of board functions by highlighting the role of various board attributes in effective 
monitoring of senior management and the impact of powerful CEOs in undermining board 
effectiveness.  
Board Attributes 
We employ a broad definition of board attributes to encompass various competencies and 
skills that board members possess and the role that these attributes play in influencing bank 
policies. For instance, a diverse board may well be able to represent the interests of various 
stakeholders and, more importantly, solve complex issues faced by a firm in its day-to-day 
operations (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Similarly, board competence in terms of prior banking 
experience and financial expertise may allow board members to better assess the impact of 
bank policies on risk (Kirkpatrick, 2009; Walker, 2009). 
While recent research has started to examine the effects of different board attributes, a 
majority of this stream has focused on assessing its impact on bank performance (e.g. Erkens 
et al. (2012); Hagendorff & Keasey (2012); Nguyen, Hagendorff, & Eshragi (2013)). Berger 
et al. (2014) are among the first to look at board demographics and bank risk-taking. They 
find that executive teams composed of younger members and more women increase bank 
risk, while boards with a higher representation of individuals with a doctorate degree are 
negatively related to bank risk.  
Ongoing policy debates have proposed the need for stakeholder representation on bank 
boards (Basel Committee, 2014; Kirkpatrick, 2009; Walker, 2009). For instance, the IMF 
(2014) recommends that some board members should be creditor representatives. This is 
consistent with extant theoretical and empirical evidence that unsecured creditors (e.g., 
investors in convertible debt (Hilscher & Raviv, 2014), holders of uninsured depositors 
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 (Bennett, Hwa, & Kwast, 2014) or interbank borrowers (Furfine, 2001; King, 2008)) are 
effective in terms of controlling risk-taking. In this context, Hilscher & Sisli-Ciamarra (2013) 
show that the presence of creditor representatives on boards is associated with creditor-
friendly policies. The authors show that mergers announced by non-financials with a higher 
fraction of creditor-directors are associated with an increase in bondholder wealth and a fall 
in shareholder wealth. 
Board competence in terms of the educational qualifications and prior relevant experience 
can also have an important bearing on bank risk-taking incentives. Given that banks are 
highly opaque and complex organizations, better education may influence the ability of 
directors to understand and interpret sophisticated risk measurement techniques and the 
impact of bank policies on risk. Consistent with this, Berger et al. (2014) show that banks 
where a higher fraction of executive officers held doctorate degrees were associated with 
lower risk.  
Harris & Raviv (2008) posit that financial expertise is essential to understand the complex 
workings of the firm and the risks associated with firm policies. Various researchers (Hau & 
Thum, 2015; Minton, Taillard, & Williamson, 2014) and policy reviews (Kirkpatrick, 2009; 
Walker, 2009) have argued that many bank boards lacked sufficient financial expertise to 
identify and control bank risk-exposures in the years preceding the crisis. Hau & Thum 
(2015) show that German banks where supervisory boards lacked financial expertise suffered 
from larger losses during the recent financial crisis. By contrast, Minton et al. (2014) report a 
positive relationship between financial expertise and bank risk in their sample of US banks. 
The authors attribute this to the fact that financial expertise allows board members to evaluate 
risky policies that may favor shareholders.  
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 Future research should evaluate the marginal impact of financial expertise on the 
likelihood that banks engage in regulatory arbitrage and underestimate their risk-exposures. 
An interesting avenue on which to base this research could be countries which employ a dual-
tier structure (e.g. Germany, Japan, etc.) where supervisory boards consist of creditors and 
employees, thereby representing stakeholder interests. While Berger et al. (2014) also study 
the implications of board characteristics, such as, age, gender, and educational background, 
on risk-taking, the focus of their research is on executive board members. Future research 
should investigate if non-executive directors in the supervisory boards have the power and 
influence to shape bank policies. This issue is particularly important given the heightened 
expectations that US bank regulators have of bank boards in terms of providing effective risk 
oversight.  
Board Process 
Another important dimension that may affect bank risk-taking is board process. Board 
process refers to the behavior and the involvement of directors in a EDQN¶V decision-making 
process, such as director attendance, conduct during board meetings, and the relationship 
between executive directors and non-executive directors (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; 
McNulty, Florackis, and Ormrod, 2013; Roberts, McNulty, Stiles, 2005;). These and similar 
aspects of director behavior are also laid out in regulatory expectations of bank boards. For 
instance, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (1999) in the U.S. lays down key 
director responsibilities which include staying informed about bank policies through regular 
attendance in meetings, preparing for meetings, and active involvement during board 
meetings.  
Forbes and Milliken (1999) develop a theoretical framework that explains the internal 
workings of the board. The authors indentify key processes that help explain how boards 
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 function. Pettgrew and McNulty (1995) categorize board involvement in firm-related matters 
into minimalist and maximalist boards. Firms where boards of directors are actively involved 
in shaping and influencing the choice of firm policies are classified as maximalist boards and 
board which yield little influence are classified as minimalist.  
McNulty et al. (2013) show that board process is a key determinant of financial risk for 
non-financial firms. However, the authors note that board process does not influence business 
risk and partly attribute this finding to passive board behavior. In the context of banks, 
Adams and Ferreira (2012) argue that attendance is a key responsibility for directors since it 
helps in obtaining firm-specific information. However, the authors show that bank boards 
have poor attendance records compared to non-financials and that regulatory pressure is not 
sufficient to boost attendance, although meeting fees and total compensation have an 
economically significant influence.   
However, there is little research on the implications of board process on risk-taking in 
banks. Internal board dynamics in terms of greater involvement of the board in key bank 
decisions can be one of the ways to improve bank governance. For instance, future research 
should assess how boards function when making important decisions. Another interesting 
issue may be to explore the importance that each bank assigns to developing director 
knowledge and skills through internal training programs and to explore if such practices can 
improve the monitoring of executives.  
CEO Power 
Another important element that moderates the effectiveness of boards of directors is CEO 
power (Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira, 2005; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998). In empirical 
studies, the power of a CEO is often captured using the number of positions held by a CEO 
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 (in particular, whether or not the CEO also acts as chairman), a &(2¶V tenure, or her 
performance relative to peers (Adams et al., 2005; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998).  
Powerful CEOs are likely to undermine board independence if they are able to influence 
board decisions and prevent boards from effective monitoring. Adams et al. (2005) show that 
firms with more powerful CEOs are characterized by higher performance variability implying 
that powerful CEOs pursue policies which result in riskier outcomes. Therefore, powerful 
CEOs are more likely to influence board decisions towards pursuing risky policies.  
Therefore, future work should assess the joint impact of bank boards and CEO power on 
bank policies. One potential line of enquiry could try to explain how board governance and 
CEO power interact. CEO power may increase with tenure and hence its effect on board 
oversight should be stronger as tenure increases. Another potential line of enquiry could 
focus on the role of CEO power in capturing the board in the period leading up to the 
financial crisis. 
Taken together, this section argues that various board attributes can play a critical role in 
providing effective oversight into the functioning of bank executives. Another key 
mechanism through which bank boards can influence managerial behavior and their risk-
taking incentives is through the structure of executive remuneration contracts. We focus on 
this issue in the next section.  
STRUCTURING CEO PAY TO MITIGATE RISK-TAKING 
Senior executives are responsible for the day-to-day management of the bank. The 
traditional setting in which CEO remuneration decisions are taken is laid out in Holmstrom 
(1982), where the board represents the interests of shareholders and evaluates performance of 
the manager. Boards influence executive behavior by overseeing, monitoring, and structuring 
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 compensation policies. Consistent with this, DeYoung et al. (2013) show that US bank boards 
responded to expanded business opportunities after the US deregulation by embedding 
option-based equity incentives to encourage risk-taking. Another potential mechanism to 
embed contractual risk-taking incentives is by use of performance-based equity awards that 
induce managers to pursue risky policies that yield short-term payoffs (Bebchuck & 
Spamann, 2009; Federal Reserve, 2010). 
 The implications of such incentives on bank behavior and risk-taking preferences 
have come under increasing scrutiny (Bebchuk & Spamann, 2009; DeYoung et al., 2013; 
Thanassoulis, 2012). This is because compensating managers with instruments that induce 
risk-taking may well subordinate the interests of other stakeholder groups (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; John & John, 1993). Consistent with this view, Chen et al. (2006) show that 
there is a positive association between the percentage of option-based CEO wealth in total 
compensation and market-based measures of bank risk (e.g. systematic risk, idiosyncratic 
risk). Cheng, Harrison, & Scheinkman (2015) show that banks where CEOs held excess CEO 
pay, calculated as the regression residual of total CEO pay on firm size, had higher risk-
exposure into subprime mortgage securities and higher return volatility. Bai & Elyasiani 
(2013) find that higher option incentives result in reduced bank stability and greater default 
risk. This association is also reflected in the choice of bank policies, with higher option-
induced incentives resulting in riskier acquisitions (Hagendorff & Vallascas, 2011) and 
riskier investment policies (DeYoung et al., 2013; Mehran & Rosenberg, 2007).  
However, over three decades of research on compensation has primarily focused on the 
link between equity-based compensation and risk-taking with little attention to other 
important components of CEO pay. Assessing alternate pay components is particularly 
important because ongoing policy reforms and emerging academic research have raised the 
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 need for compensating executives with instruments that promote long-term stability (Bolton 
et al., 2015; Federal Reserve, 2010).  
In the following subsections, we shed some light on debt-based pay as well as the vesting 
schedule of equity awards which could affect firm risk-taking. Empirical research on these 
issues will enrich our knowledge on different characteristics of CEO pay to arrive at a holistic 
picture of the incentives arising from CEO compensation. 
Recalibrating CEO pay to creditor wealth and longer time-horizons 
Inside Debt. One way to align the interests of CEOs with firm creditors involves debt-
like instruments. A growing literature has shown that CEO pay consists of debt-like 
instruments, in the form of pension benefits and deferred compensation, and compensating 
CEOs with this so-called µLQVLGH GHEW¶ can mitigate risk-taking (Cassel, Huang, Sanchez, & 
Stuart, 2012; Edmans & Liu, 2011; Sundaram & Yermack, 2007). The underlying rationale 
behind this is that CEOs with inside debt have a claim on bank cash flows because inside 
debt only becomes payable upon retirement. Crucially, these claims are unfunded and 
unsecured firm obligations, thereby putting the value of inside debt at risk if the firm defaults 
and exposing CEOs to the same default risk concerns faced by external creditors (Edmans & 
Liu, 2011). As a result, when paid with inside debt, the risk preferences of CEOs should 
converge with those of external creditors, implying that higher inside debt may mitigate risk-
taking concerns in the banking industry. 
The use of inside debt is widespread and, most executives hold large amounts of inside 
debt. Sundaram & Yermack (2007) show that 78% of large S&P firms in their sample had 
some form of inside debt arrangements, with an average CEO holding $4.2 million in 
pensions. In the banking industry, Bennett, Guntay, & Unal (2015) show that 72% of banks 
held some form of inside debt in 2006, with an average CEO holding nearly $3.1 million. 
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 Despite the widespread use of inside debt amongst banks, only a limited amount of 
applied research has assessed the impact of inside debt on bank policies. DeYoung et al. 
(2013) point out that bank CEO incentives are more heavily geared towards the interests of 
shareholders than in other industries even though, equity makes up only a small proportion of 
a EDQN¶V balance sheet. It is therefore particularly important to understand if aligning 
managerial interests with the interests of external creditors dampens risk-taking.  
More recently, Bennett et al. (2015) show a negative association between inside debt and 
a market-based measure of default risk. Bolton et al. (2015) also show that the mandatory 
disclosure of inside debt holdings of bank CEOs in 2006 was perceived positively by 
creditors, with higher inside debt associated with lower CDS spreads. Similarly, Bekkum 
(2015) reports a negative relation between CEO and Chief Financial Officer (CFO) inside 
debt and measures of subsequent market volatility and tail risk. Srivastav, Armitage, & 
Hagendorff (2014) show that bank CEOs with higher inside debt are associated with more 
conservative bank payout policies. 
Although research has shown that inside debt helps to reduce risk, we know little about 
how inside debt affects the separate risk components (idiosyncratic risk and systemic risk) 
and, by extension, incentives to shift the risk of default onto the safety net. Future research 
can also aid ongoing policy discussions over CEO pay by establishing how any risk 
reductions are realized.  
Finally, existing measures of inside debt have been developed for non-financial firms. For 
instance, Jensen & Meckling (1976) proposed that CEOs face no risk-taking incentives if the 
ratio of inside debt to inside equity (i.e. a &(2¶V personal leverage) resembles the ratio of a 
ILUP¶V outside debt to outside equity (i.e. firm leverage). More recently, Wei & Yermack 
(2011) suggest measuring the strength of inside debt incentives as the sensitivity of a &(2¶V 
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 personal leverage to firm leverage. While such measures may be suitable for non-financial 
firms, their applicability to banks is questionable. This is because banks are highly leveraged 
making it nearly impossible for a &(2¶V personal leverage to match anything resembling the 
leverage of the bank she is leading.  
Further, key bank liabilities such as deposits benefit from explicit guarantees. Therefore, 
the components of inside debt ratios do not compare like for like: in banks, inside debt ratios 
contain both insured debt in the form of deposits as well as more junior (and unsecured) bank 
debt. Therefore, future research will need to more accurately measure the incentives 
originating from inside debt for banks to gain a better understanding of how these incentives 
impact the risk-taking behavior of senior bank managers.  
Characteristics of CEO Compensation Contracts. Next to inside debt, an alternative 
way to mitigate the risk-taking incentives inherent in bank CEO pay is to discourage the 
adoption of equity awards that motivate executives to focus on meeting short-term targets. 
Equity awards granted to firm executives are subject to vesting criteria, wherein executives 
receive their awards gradually over the next one to five years. Therefore, executives with a 
long vesting schedule are more sensitive to long-term stability since they may not receive 
awards if the firm defaults.  
Mehran et al. (2011) note that around 49% of bank CEOs in their sample held option 
awards which vested within one year. If equity awards vest within a short time, the payoffs to 
bank CEOs are no longer sensitive to the much longer time horizon over which economic 
risks are realized. This may incentivize CEOs to pursue bank policies that maximize current 
equity payoffs at the expense of long-term instability.  
However, Fahlenbrach & Stulz (2011) note that there is a lack of evidence to show that 
bank CEO pay resulted in short-termism. The authors find that bank CEOs held on to vested 
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 equity and option grants before the crisis and subsequently bore huge wealth losses. This is in 
conflict with the widespread notion of pervasive short-termism inherent in CEO pay and it 
warrants further empirical research. A starting point for such an investigation could be the 
work of Gopalan, Milbourn, Song, & Thakor (2014) who devise a novel measure of CEO pay 
duration to reflect the level of short-termism underlying CEO pay. The authors define pay 
duration as the weighted average of the vesting schedule of options, stocks, and cash, with 
weights assigned according to the percentage contribution of each component to total pay.  
Future research into CEO pay should also explore if the vesting-schedule of equity 
awards can affect risk-taking. Most critically, there is a need to assess if CEO pay in banking 
is more short-term in nature and causes higher levels of risk-taking than in other industries. 
Another challenge is to assess the mechanisms, such as the use of long-term deferred equity, 
through which CEO pay duration may be extended in order to promote long-term stability. 
Relatedly, various equity awards are conditional on performance-based vesting criteria 
wherein CEOs can accelerate the rate at which their equity awards vest if they meet certain 
performance criteria (e.g. share price increases). This tends to significantly increase the value 
of the existing equity portfolio of CEOs and may result in giving CEOs stronger incentives to 
increase firm risk (Bettis, Bizjak, Coles, & Kalpahty, 2011; Brisley, 2006). Future work 
should therefore account for both the time- and performance-based vesting criteria of CEO 
pay and assess whether certain features of equity awards can exacerbate risk-taking concerns. 
Taken together, our review highlights the need for widening the scope of the literature by 
assessing the role of alternate pay components in remuneration contracts. Specifically, boards 
can align managerial incentives with bank stability by using pay components that offer 
payoffs over an extended horizon such as the use of inside debt and long-term vesting 
conditions on equity awards.  
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 The next and final section of this review examines the role of corporate governance 
arrangements in improving the role of effectiveness of risk oversight.  
BANK RISK MANAGEMENT AND RISK EXPOSURES 
The role of risk management is to evaluate the impact of a ILUP¶V current and future 
policies on its risk-exposure. A review of risk governance at major banks by the Senior 
Supervisors Group (2009), an international forum of senior representatives from various 
supervisory authorities, highlighted inadequate risk management practices behind the failure 
of banks to identify and control for their exposures to extreme events. Emerging literature on 
risk governance has also shown its importance for ensuring bank stability. For instance, Keys, 
Mukherjee, Seru, & Vig (2009) show that stronger risk management departments (measured 
by the share of top risk PDQDJHU¶V compensation relative to the top five executives) originate 
less risky mortgage portfolios.  
Aebi, Sabato, & Schmid (2012) show that banks where the Chief Risk Officer (CRO) 
directly reports to the board had stronger performance during the financial crisis of 2007-08. 
Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) provide evidence on the relationship between risk management 
and bank risk. The authors develop a Risk Management Index which consolidates different 
dimensions of the risk management function (e.g. the presence of a CRO on the board, 
experience on the risk committee, etc.) to show that banks with a higher risk management 
score in 2006 were less risky during the crisis. Lingel & Sheedy (2012) extend Ellul & 
<HUUDPLOOL¶V study by developing a risk management index in an international setting and 
show that banks with stronger risk management had lower risk over the period 2004-2010. 
The authors focus on a sample of large international banks in order to include the dynamics 
of different legal, cultural, and regulatory environments. 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved..
 While prior literature has shown some evidence on the effectiveness of risk governance, 
some important questions on the topic remain unanswered. For instance, there is limited 
research that analyzes whether risk management functions should be rigid, that is, based on 
compliance or more focused on involving risk managers in key decisions without a formal 
system of compliance (Stulz, 2015). In this regard, Halls, Mikes, & Millo (2013) conduct a 
field study of two UK banks and show that the bank where risk management followed a rigid 
µEox-WLFNLQJ¶ approach failed to control its risk-exposure.  
More empirical and theoretical research along these lines will help to identify the 
antecedents of effective risk management. For instance, banks with effective risk 
management should be more likely to proactively monitor risk-exposures and change practice 
in response to crisis episodes during or after periods of poor performance. Relatedly, little is 
known about the determinants of the composition of risk management committees and how 
its composition affects bank risk-taking.  
Another aspect of risk management that deserves more attention is a EDQN¶V risk culture. 
Mehran et al. (2011) and Stulz (2015) argue that risk management practices are shaped by the 
risk-taking culture within a firm. Ellul & Yeramilli (2013) posit that the risk culture and risk 
management function may be jointly endogenous, that is, banks which have a more 
pronounced culture for risk-taking may also be less likely to install an effective system of risk 
management. Thus, it is not risk management but corporate culture that determines risk 
(Stulz, 2015). Consistent with this, Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, & Stulz (2012) show that risk 
culture is a strong determinant of bank risk-taking. The authors document that bank risk and 
performance during the recent financial crisis are positively related to their performance 
during the 1998 crisis (sparked by 5XVVLD¶V default on some of its debt), thereby suggesting 
that banks with persistent risk culture take more risks. More recently, Bouwman and 
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 Malmendier (2015) also show that banks that have experienced macroeconomic and bank-
specific shocks in the past are more likely to engage in safe lending practices and higher 
capitalization. One potential reason could be that a EDQN¶V culture is shaped by its history of 
experiencing and surviving such shocks which further influences its future risk-taking 
behavior. 
While quantifying the risk culture of a particular bank is difficult to incorporate into 
empirical analysis, future work should attempt to identify various dimensions of risk culture 
and account for its role in influencing risk management practices in banks. Another important 
issue is to assess how different governance mechanisms interact with each other. For 
example, banks with a culture that promotes risk-taking may be more likely to have weak risk 
management systems and this could have an important bearing on the type of executives and 
directors this type of institution hires. By contrast, an effective system of risk management 
may be undermined if the board lacks expertise to conduct meaningful risk assessments. 
Future research therefore needs to jointly take into account the dynamics of board 
effectiveness and risk management in order to develop a holistic understanding of how 
different governance mechanisms interact with each other.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this paper is to review the literature on the corporate governance of banks 
with a particular focus on the implications of governance for bank risk-taking. Current 
governance practices are based on the principle that corporate governance mechanisms are 
designed to protect shareholder interests with shareholders exercising control over bank 
operations and policies via the board of directors (Becht et al., 2011; Mehran et al., 2011). 
However, one of the lessons drawn from the recent crisis is the need to understand better how 
to design governance mechanisms that represent the interests of creditors and taxpayers, in 
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 addition to bank shareholders, with the aim of controlling bank risk-taking more effectively 
(Basel Committee, 2014; Federal Reserve, 2010; Kashyap et al., 2008; Kirkpatrick, 2009). 
Banks differ from non-banking firms in important ways that are relevant for risk-taking. 
Excessive leverage and the presence of government guarantees may exacerbate risk-taking 
incentives in the banking industry. Further, risk-taking will be beneficial for shareholders but 
detrimental for bank creditors and taxpayers who underwrite the type of guarantees that 
protect many bank liability holders from loss (Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993; Merton, 1977). 
This literature review offers insights into how corporate governance can mitigate the risk-
taking incentives which banks face.  
In particular, we highlight three future strands of research on the internal governance of 
banks. First, there is a need to assess the impact of different board attributes on risk-taking. 
While prior research has largely focused on broad board measures (e.g. board size and board 
independence), our review encourages future research to focus on the more fine-grained 
aspects of how boards function, including the educational qualifications of directors and other 
personal characteristics. Second, empirical work has only recently begun to examine pay 
instruments that incentivize managers to focus on the long-term stability of banks. This 
review highlights the role of debt-based forms of compensation as a device to mitigate bank 
risk-taking. Finally, research needs to explore the risk management culture and risk 
management practices inside banks.  
Future research should also address some of the fundamental governance issues for banks 
that remain unanswered to date. For instance, it will be interesting to explore the risk 
implications if banks represent the interests of creditors, taxpayers and shareholders on 
boards. In this regard, our study supports the conclusions of de Haan and Vlahu (2015) who 
posit that future research on bank governance should take into account regulatory distortions 
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 and the role of large creditors within a broader governance framework. Moreover, we know 
very little about the inner workings of bank boards in terms of group dynamics and if such 
board processes can influence the choice of bank policies.  More empirical evidence on the 
issues highlighted in this review will help develop a deeper understanding of bank behavior 
within governance systems and serve as an empirical basis for ongoing governance 
recommendations for sustainable bank risk-taking. 
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 NOTES 
 
1. Arguably, there exist various other dimensions that resulted in bank fragility during 
the global financial crisis of 2007-09, such as inadequate bank capital (Hanson, 
Kashyap, & Stein, 2011; Kashyap et al., 2008), unregulated shadow banking system 
(Gennaioli, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2013), and the too-big-to-fail problem (Freixas & 
Rochet, 2013). However, the focus of our paper is on one such channel: governance 
failures.  
2. While Leveraged Buyouts (LBO) are also highly levered, LBOs control agency costs 
of debt (e.g. risk-shifting) through various strategies such as the use of loan 
covenants, presence of LBO specialist sponsors who represent both equityholder and 
debtholder interests, and use of strip financing where investors hold both equity-like 
and debt-like instruments (Jensen, 1989; Opler, 1993) 
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TABLE 1  
Summary of Prior Literature on Bank Governance and Risk-taking 
This table presents a brief overview of prior literature focusing on the impact of bank governance on risk-taking incentives.  
Study Governance Measure Summary 
Board Attributes   
Beltratti and Stulz 
(2012) 
Shareholder-friendly 
board index collected 
by Institutional 
Shareholder Services 
(ISS) 
x Risk Measures: Default Risk (Z-score); Equity Risk (Idiosyncratic component of Stock 
Volatility); Leverage Risk (Equity minus Tangible Assets scaled by Assets); Portfolio Risk 
(Fraction of Loan Writedowns to Assets) 
x Key Findings: Shareholder-friendly boards are positively associated with default risk, 
although this relationship is not entirely robust to different risk measures 
 
Erkens et al. 
(2012) 
Independent Directors x Risk Measures: Default Risk (Expected Default Frequency); Equity Risk (Stock Volatility); 
Leverage Risk (Amount of Equity Capital raised) 
x Key Findings: No significant relationship between independent directors and default risk or 
equity risk. Banks with a higher fraction of independent directors reduced leverage risk by 
raising equity during the financial crisis. 
 
Berger et al. 
(2014) 
Demographics of 
Executive directors 
(Age, Educational 
Qualification, and 
Gender) 
x Risk Measures: Portfolio Risk (Asset Density, Loan Portfolio Concentration) 
x Key Findings: Portfolio risk is positively associated with younger executives and female 
directors. Portfolio risk is negatively associated with the fraction of directors with doctorate. 
 
Minton et al. 
(2014) 
Financial expertise of 
independent directors 
x Risk Measures: Equity risk (Stock Volatility); Leverage risk (Risk-weighted Capital Ratio); 
Portfolio risk (Fraction of Loans secured by Real Estate) 
x Key Findings: Boards consisting of higher amount of financial experts were positively 
associated with bank risk 
 
IMF Report (2014) Board Size 
Independent directors 
x Risk Measures: Default Risk (Z-score and Distance-to-default); Equity Risk (Systematic 
component of Stock Volatility); Tail Risk (Expected Shortfall, Marginal Expected Shortfall, 
and Systemic risk) 
x Key Findings: Higher fraction of independent directors is associated with lower bank risk, 
although boards that have more financial experts are associated with higher risk. 
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Executive Pay 
  
Hagendorff and 
Vallascas (2011) 
CEO pay-risk 
sensitivity or Vega 
x Risk Measures'HIDXOW5LVN0HUWRQ¶VGLVWDQFH-to-default) 
x Key Findings: High vega banks pursue acquisitions that result in increasing default risk 
 
DeYoung et al. 
(2013) 
CEO pay-risk 
sensitivity or Vega 
CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity or Delta 
x Risk Measures: Equity risk (Stock Volatility) 
x Key Findings: Higher Vega is associated with an increase in equity risk. Higher Vega 
results in shifting the business model of banks to non-traditional activities, i.e. a greater 
fraction of income from non-interest bearing activities and derivatives investment.  
 
IMF Report (2014) Fraction of equity-
based pay 
x Risk Measures: Default Risk (Z-score and Distance-to-default); Equity Risk (Systematic 
component of Stock Volatility); Tail Risk (Expected Shortfall, Marginal Expected Shortfall, 
and Systemic Risk) 
x Key Findings: Higher equity-based pay is associated with lower bank risk 
Bennett et al. 
(2015) 
CEO debt-based 
compensation 
x Risk Measures: Default risk (Expected Default Frequency) 
x Key Findings: Higher inside debt is associated with lower default risk during the crisis 
 
Bekkum (2015) Fraction of CEO debt-
based compensation 
x Risk Measures: Tail Risk (Value-at-Risk, Expected Shortfall, Covariance); Equity Risk 
(Stock Volatility) 
x Key Findings: Inside debt is negatively associated with different measures of bank risk 
 
Bolton et al. 
(2015) 
CEO inside debt to 
equity-based 
compensation 
x Risk Measures: Announcement effect on CDS spreads 
x Key Findings: Announcement of CEO inside debt holdings is associated with lower CDS 
spreads 
 
Cheng et al. (2015) Residual compensation x Risk Measures: Equity risk (Stock Volatility) 
x Key Findings: Residual compensation is positively associated with equity risk 
   
 
Risk Management 
  
Keys et al. (2009) Risk Manager Power: x Risk Measures: Portfolio Risk (Default rates on subprime loans) 
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 Fraction of risk 
managers pay to top-5 
executive pay 
x Key Findings: Stronger risk management is associated with less risky subprime loan 
securitizations 
Fahlenbrach et al. 
(2012) 
Risk culture, as proxied 
by bank performance 
during the 1998 
Russian crisis 
x Risk Measures: Default Risk (Bank Failures during the 2007-08 period) 
x Key Findings: Banks with persistent risk-taking culture performed poorly and were more 
likely to fail during the 2007-08 financial crisis 
 
Ellul and Yeramilli 
(2013) 
Strength and 
independence of risk 
management function 
x Risk Measures: Tail Risk (Expected Shortfall); Credit Risk (Fraction of Non-performing 
Loans) 
x Key Findings: Stronger Risk Management Index (RMI) is associated with lower tail risk 
exposure and better loan quality. RMI is also a strong predictor of bank tail risk exposures 
during the financial crisis 
 
IMF (2014) Presence of risk 
committee 
x Risk Measures: Default Risk (Z-score and Distance-to-default); Equity Risk (Systematic 
component of Stock Volatility); Tail Risk (Expected Shortfall, Marginal Expected Shortfall, 
and Systemic risk) 
x Key Findings: Banks with risk committee are associated with lower risk-taking 
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